University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2017

Creating Precedents Through Words and Deeds
Harold J. Krent

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Krent, Harold J., "Creating Precedents Through Words and Deeds" (2017). Constitutional Commentary. 394.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/394

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

KRENT_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/11/17 7:06 AM

CREATING PRECEDENTS THROUGH
WORDS AND DEEDS
UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS
INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION. By Harold H.
Bruff.1 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2015. Pp. 557.
$55.00 (cloth), $35.00 (paper).

Harold J. Krent2
Harold H. Bruff’s book, Untrodden Ground: How Presidents
Interpret the Constitution, is a must read for those interested in
understanding the myriad dynamics that shape presidents’ impact
on constitutional interpretation. The author examines each
administration in chronological fashion to shed light on our
understanding of the U.S. Constitution. No other book to my
knowledge has been so ambitious in assessing each president’s
contributions to constitutional interpretation, and few other
books are infused with such lively prose.
Bruff summarizes well the influences that mold presidential
interpretation of the Constitution: “the president’s character,
experience, and values; the incentives that the office and current
politics create; the practical problems that must be solved; and an
awareness of the actions of their own predecessors” (p. 457).
From President George Washington’s exercise of the treaty
power to President Andrew Jackson’s supervision over the
executive branch, and from President Abraham Lincoln’s view of
his emergency powers to President Harry Truman’s
understanding of the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the book
examines circumstances that forced presidents to take action or
make statements reflecting interpretation of the Constitution.
These include decisions implicating constitutional interpretation,
such as the use of military force, as well as interpretations of the
text as justifications to refuse to enforce laws or turn over
1.
2.

Rosenbaum Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School.
Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Tech.
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information to Congress. Presidents affect our understanding of
the Constitution by both words and deeds.
Judicial interpretation of the Constitution is studied in every
law school and in many political science departments. Much ink
has been spilled by legal academics and political scientists to
generate theories on how judges should approach that critical
task. Clashes between originalists and interpretivists take place on
and off the bench. And, there are widely divergent views held by
those in each interpretive camp. No consensus, for instance, has
been reached as to the degree that originalism even is possible
given the lapse of time or to whether interpretivism permits
objective constraints.
Irrespective of the ongoing originalist/interpretivist debate,
Bruff is correct that legal and political science scholars have
devoted relatively sparse attention to how members of the
coordinate branches interpret the Constitution.3 As have others
within the last generation,4 Bruff rejects the conventional notion
that constitutional interpretation is within the exclusive province
of the judiciary. The author makes a strong case that presidential
interpretation of the Constitution matters more in the real world
than judicial decisions. (He brushes aside the parallel question of
constitutional interpretation by members of Congress.) When
presidents sign executive agreements or break treaties, in a sense
they interpret the Constitution, as they do when they fire
subordinates, exercise the recess appointment power, and
impound funds. Accordingly, his book examines the issues arising
in each administration that impact the Constitution’s reach.
Untrodden Ground eschews a normative account of
presidential interpretations. For instance, does it matter if the
presidential interpretation is reflected in deed, such as in
President Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase (pp. 68-72), or
rather in a statement such as Jefferson’s justification for
3. For exceptions, see generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Michael C.
Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (justifying presidential power to interpret the law but not
examining precedential role of prior interpretations); Trevor Morrison, Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006).
4. Contemporary constitutional theorists, by and large, agree with Bruff. For
examples, see sources cited supra note 3.
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pardoning those convicted of Sedition Act violations (p. 64)?
Should less precedential weight be accorded presidential actions
manifesting constitutional positions as opposed to more reflective
articulation of constitutional values? Possibly, but on the other
hand, presidents are not judges, and they are held accountable by
the people principally for their conduct in office, not their
constitutional analysis.5
Moreover, should presidents defer to interpretations of
coordinate branches and, if so, under what conditions? Should
they defer to interpretations of prior presidents more than to
coordinate branches? Does the extent to which the constitutional
provision implicates presidential power as opposed to the rights
of individuals matter? These and other questions can be studied
by examining the steps presidents have in fact taken and what
justifications they have used over time.
In the pages that follow, I tackle one piece of the puzzle,
charting the degree to which presidents should factor in the prior
actions and statements of predecessors implicating constitutional
views. I argue, first, that such precedents matter, and second,
perhaps more controversially, that contemporary constitutional
justification of actions is more salient than either unexplained
presidential actions bearing on constitutional interpretation or
standalone executive interpretations of the Constitution
untethered to particular presidential conduct. The union of word
and deed cements the precedential force of the constitutional
interpretation.
I. DO PRESIDENTIAL PRECEDENTS MATTER?
As an initial matter, some may question whether presidents
should care about any precedents—executive, judicial, or
legislative—before taking action that manifests a particular
interpretation of a constitutional provision. Under the
Constitution, presidents must ensure that their actions are
5. Randolph Moss has written that “the public may elect a President based, in part,
on his view of the law,” Randolph Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1327 (2000), but
one would be hard-pressed to cite a campaign in which the presidential candidate’s
constitutional interpretation had any salience, although the issue arose in the LincolnDouglas debates. See also Dawn Johnsen, The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend
Constitutional Equality Rather Than the Defense of Marriage Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
599 (2012).
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consistent with what they (and their advisors) believe to be the
constitutional commands,6 but need not be bound by what their
predecessors believed. Nor, in fact, need presidents be bound—
except perhaps in a particular case or controversy7—by how
judges have interpreted the Constitution. Presidents, in other
words, must use their best judgment in taking care to enforce the
law and in acting as Commander-in-Chief based on their own
understanding of the constitutional text. Indeed, President
William H. Taft rightly insisted that a president “does not
consider himself bound by the policies or constitutional views of
his predecessors” (p. 206).
Nonetheless, as Professor Bruff implicitly asserts in the book,
the precedents of prior presidents matter. George Washington
famously related that “[t]here is scarcely any part of my conduct
which may not hereafter be drawn into precedent.”8 Thus, he
knew that every step he took, from dispatching troops to quell the
Whiskey Rebellion (p. 49) to announcing the Neutrality
Proclamation (p. 42), likely would shape the conduct of future
presidents by defining the scope of a president’s power under
Article II. Many presidents thereafter self-consciously have
defended their stances by referring to actions of predecessors. For
instance, when President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Tenure in
Office Act, he stated that a ban on any Senate role in removing
executive branch officials was “settled by precedent, settled by the
practice of the Government” (p. 169). When President Harry
Truman resolved to intervene in Korea, he considered prior
historical examples and, “impressed by the appearance of
precedent” (p. 273), moved forward.9 When President Richard
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution for infringing on his
Commander in Chief powers, he decried Congress’s effort to take
away “authorities which the President has properly exercised
under the Constitution for almost 200 years” (p. 338), and he later
asserted that he was following his predecessors in impounding
funds (p. 344). And, when President George W. Bush more
recently defended the NSA surveillance initiative, he stated that
6. Presidents, of course, take an oath to uphold the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 8.
7. Even that is controversial. For an argument that presidents need not be bound in
particular cases and controversies, see Paulsen, supra note 3.
8. NORMAN J. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENCY 14 (1970).
9. Dean Acheson presented a formal defense based on those precedents (p. 275).
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“previous Presidents have used the same constitutional authority
I have” (p. 412). The references to precedents might reflect more
of an effort to persuade a skeptical public than a belief that the
precedent matters, but even the public invocation of the historical
examples reflects the importance of the steps taken by prior
presidents reflecting constitutional principles.10 Presidents
recognize the greater public acceptance from following
precedents.
Caring about precedents reinforces stability of the
presidency. A president will be seen as more legitimate if he or
she follows the constitutional path set by predecessors. For one
example, President Washington at the outset believed that the
Constitution permitted him to exercise the veto power solely for
egregious congressional actions, and he vetoed only two bills.11
That precedent stood for years as neither President Adams used
the veto power at all.12 But, from the period of Andrew Jackson
on, presidents exercised the veto power more aggressively,
viewing the veto power under Article II as a permissible tool with
which to influence domestic policy. Thus, when President Jackson
broke ranks with his predecessors and utilized the veto twelve
times, he was challenged for his adventurous exercise of the veto.
(pp. 95-96). Breaking ranks, in other words, comes with a political
price. President Jackson weathered the storm and, over time,
presidential exercise of the veto became more routine and viewed
as consistent with a conscientious executive.
For another example, when President Reagan vetoed
legislation incorporating a legislative veto, he referred to a long
line of presidents before him who had challenged that legislative
arrangement.13 Those precedents reinforced the legitimacy in the
public eye of his robust view of executive powers, and his views
ultimately found support in INS v. Chadha,14 which invalidated
10. Similarly, when President Obama issued an executive order outlawing
discrimination based on same sex marriage, he explained why he deemed discrimination
on that basis so inimical to the nation’s spirit and history, and he did so citing the examples
of FDR and Eisenhower in banning racial discrimination in at least parts of the federal
workforce. Exec. Order 13672, July 21, 2014.
11. At the convention, the veto power in large part was justified on the basis of the
need to fend off legislative encroachment. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS
THAT PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON
(Cambridge 1993).
12. HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 18 (2005).
13. Stuart Taylor, Legislative Vetoes Face Legal Attack, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1981.
14. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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the legislative veto. Bruff persuasively asserts that “[t]he ongoing
arguments take place in a framework created by what has
happened and what issues have been opened or closed by
developments in our national life” (p. 458). Executive precedent
matters.15
II. PRECEDENT BY WORDS AND DEEDS?
Professor Bruff does not distinguish between presidential
interpretations reflected in words and deeds. And, of course, he is
right that presidents affect interpretation of the Constitution
whether dispatching troops, appending a signing statement to
legislation, or giving a speech. The institution of the presidency
gains stability the more that presidential interpretation is viewed
as consistent. This is not to suggest that presidents can be boxed
in by interpretations of their predecessors, but rather that
perceived departures in constitutional interpretation carry with
them a price of explanation and justification in the public eye.
Three contexts arise. First, many presidential actions are
unaccompanied by any statement or justification, such as dispatch
of troops or utilization of surveillance methods. Second,
presidents, particularly in signing statements and indirectly
through Attorney General Opinions, address the constitutionality
of particular courses of action. Finally, presidents at times justify
conduct contemporaneously by reference to the Constitution.
1. ACTION
Although presidents in the heat of decision-making
doubtfully consider whether to defer to executive precedents,
some precedents are more salient than others. At one end of the
spectrum, consider action unaccompanied by any justification.
How are the public and future presidents to know even whether
the presidential action embodied a constitutional interpretation?
The president may have called for surveillance or sent troops to
quell a disturbance without any concern as to whether the action
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment or Commander in
Chief Clause. Or, the president may have fired a subordinate in a
fit of rage without paying heed to the niceties of the president’s
15. And, as Justice Frankfurter famously stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), judges as well
consider history as a gloss on the constitutional text.
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assumed removal authority under Article II. There is a latent
ambiguity, in other words, as to whether particular deeds even
encompass an intended constitutional interpretation. In this
context, actions may not speak louder than words.
Nonetheless, although others have not focused on the
precedential value of actions unaccompanied by public
justification,16 such actions serve to shape the course of future
presidents’ views of the Constitution. Actions, over time, can
embody or reflect constitutional interpretation. Consider
presidents’ use of executive agreements throughout history.
When presidents initially signed such agreements, perhaps it was
out of necessity with no consideration as to the constitutionality
of the practice. And, even if the use of executive agreements over
time can be seen to express a view of the president’s Article II
power over foreign affairs, the grounds are murky. Does the use
of executive agreements comport with Article II because the
treaty power is not exclusive or because executive agreements are
less important than treaties? Is the use of executive agreements
consistent with Article II as long as Congress has the opportunity
afterwards to ratify them? Despite the ambiguity, the repeated
use of executive agreements over many presidential
administrations builds legitimacy.17 The same dynamic holds true
for presidential decisions to commit troops abroad without prior
congressional authorization,18 and for presidential exercise of the
removal authority.19 Presidential actions create a form of
precedent that helps channel the conduct of future presidents.
2. PRESIDENTIAL WORDS
Presidential statements about the Constitution also form
precedent. Statements by themselves can impact future
presidencies and, at times, their influence on others can be just as
great as action.20 Presidential statements about the
unacceptability of discrimination based on race, for instance, have
16. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney
General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
375, 398-99 (1993); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010).
17. KRENT, supra note 12, at 96–102.
18. Id. at 112–15.
19. Id. at 39–46.
20. For a more theoretical exploration, see Hillary Putnam, The Meaning of
“Meaning”, in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 215–71 (1975).
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had a huge role in changing others’ view of the constitutional
text.21 In contrast to the uncertainty that may be left by an action
implicating
constitutional
interpretation, a
president’s
articulation of a constitutional interpretation less ambiguously
articulates a view of the Constitution to be followed in the
future.22
Many presidential statements on the meaning of the
Constitution can be found in writings of the President’s chief
lawyer, the Attorney General. Congress created the Office of
Attorney General in 1789, and directed the Attorney General to
provide a learned opinion on questions of law when asked by the
President.23 The very format of written opinions reinforces that
the opinions should be available for public review and possibly
serve as precedent for the future. Moreover, written opinions
generally take into account more details and circumstances than
would oral advice. Attorney General Opinions may not reflect the
view of presidents directly but, given that presidents select and
remove Attorney Generals, the Opinions converge with those of
the presidents themselves.24
Attorney General opinions long have addressed issues of
constitutional concern, many of which would not likely arise in a
court challenge, such as the scope of the pardon power.25
Attorney General Opinions not only cite but also largely follow
prior executive precedent even when the Attorneys General
might have reached a different constitutional interpretation had

21. FDR in Executive Order 8802 prohibited racial discrimination in the national
defense industry, stating that “it is the policy of the United States to encourage full
participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless
of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life
within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups
within its borders.” Exec. Order No. 8802 (June 25, 1941).
22. Indeed, President Madison, despite his doubts about the constitutionality of the
Bank of the United States, signed a reauthorization bill during his term because, in his
view, the constitutionality of the bank had been settled by practice (p. 40), and the impact
of consistent practice has been widely noted. The precedents referred to likely included
those of past presidents as well as the courts.
23. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
24. Presidents, of course, may remove Attorneys General from office for any policy
disagreement.
25. Individuals likely lack standing to question presidential exercise of the pardon
power. For an Attorney General Opinion on the pardon power, see, for example,
Pardoning Power of the President, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 579 (April 22, 1852) (Hon. John
Crittenden).
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the issue not been addressed previously.26 Attorney General Wirt,
for instance, wrote that “it would be laborious, indecent, and
unsettling to review the previous decisions of the executive.”27 In
opining that interest on particular claims against the government
would not be allowed, Attorney General John Crittenden wrote
that the previously expressed interpretation “has ever since been
followed; and . . . such a precedent and construction must be
considered as established and settled in this instance.”28 As Dean
Trevor Morrison has summarized, “Attorneys General typically
looked to the opinions of their predecessors not just as sources of
useful experience but as authoritative precedents.”29 Executive
interpretation may involve different analytical steps and
considerations than that by judges,30 but the opinions, whether on
the scope of the recess appointment authority31 or the power to
commit troops abroad,32 create a type of precedent, even though
in no way binding.33 Precedent shapes presidents’ interpretation
of the constitutional text.
Presidents have also issued countless signing statements
manifesting their view of the constitutionality or potential
constitutionality of the proffered legislation. The signing
statements differ from Attorney General Opinions in several
respects. They are less scholarly, make no pretense of creating
precedent, reflect the President’s view as opposed to that of the
Attorney General, and focus more narrowly on the legislation to
which they are attached. Nonetheless, the signing statements as
26. Jerry L. Mashaw & Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the
Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 7, 44 (“Reliance on past precedent may have
been the only interpretive rule about which every Attorney General under consideration
appears to have been equally dogmatic.”).
27. HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN
THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 84 (1937).
28. Power of the Secretary of the Treasury Respecting Certain Florida Claims, 5 Op.
Att’y Gen. 333, 353 (1851).
29. Morrison, supra note 16, at 1474.
30. See McGinnis, supra note 16, at 398–99.
31. Edmund Randolph, Edmund Randolph’s Opinion on Recess Appointments (July
7, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 165, 165–67 (John Catanzariti ed.,
1990).
32. Authority to Use United States Military Force in Somalia, 16 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel (1992).
33. For an analysis of precedent in Office of Legal Counsel decisions, see Morrison,
supra note 16. The Office itself released guidelines suggesting that its opinions should
receive “due respect” from successors. Id. at 1453. Attorney Generals have delegated
opinion writing to OLC, and OLC opinions, to a large extent, reflect the views of the
Attorney General and the President.
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well as the Attorney General Opinions have some force as
precedent.
President George W. Bush controversially issued statements
to challenge over 1000 provisions of 172 laws he signed.34
President Obama has followed the practice, but less aggressively.
For instance, in signing the National Defense Authorization Act
of Fiscal Year 2013, he objected that “[c]ertain provisions in the
Act threaten to interfere with my constitutional duty to supervise
the executive branch,” namely by “requir[ing] a subordinate to
submit materials directly to the Congress without change, and [the
Act] thereby obstructs the traditional chain of command.”35 Such
statements plainly reflect the president’s constitutional views, but
they can best be thought of as presidential dicta or a type of
advisory opinion. We are not sure whether the subordinate will
submit to Congress any materials at all or whether the president
will insist upon the right to preview and alter materials before they
are sent.36
President Obama’s Article II objection above echoes that of
his predecessors. President George W. Bush as well criticized
legislation requiring executive branch officers to issue
recommendations directly to Congress. For instance, in signing
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,37 he stated,
“[m]oreover, to the extent such provisions of the Act would
require submission of legislative recommendations, they would
impermissibly impinge upon the President’s constitutional
authority to submit only those legislative recommendations that

34. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Obama Circumvents Laws with “Signing Statement,” A
Tool He Promised To Use Lightly, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/obama-circumvents-laws-with-signing-statements-a-tool-he-promisedto-use-lightly/2014/06/02/9d76d46a-ea73-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html.
35. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Jan. 2, 2013).
36. Similarly, in signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, H.R. 1105,
President Obama defended his right “to indicate when a bill that is presented for
Presidential signature includes provisions that are subject to well-founded constitutional
objections.” In part, he stated that “[n]umerous provisions of the legislation purport to
condition the authority of officers to spend or reallocate funds on the approval of
congressional committees. These are impermissible forms of legislative aggrandizement in
the execution of the laws other than by enactment of statutes.” This and other signing
statements from 2001 to the present are available at http://www.coherentbabble.com/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2016).
37. Pub. L No. 107–295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
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he judges to be necessary and expedient.”38 President Clinton also
stated that he would interpret Section 4422 of the Balanced
Budget Act of 199739 “in light of my constitutional duty and
authority to recommend to the Congress such legislative measures
as I judge necessary and expedient, and to supervise and guide my
subordinates, including the review of their proposed
communications to the Congress.”40
President Obama in the 2013 Authorization Act also
objected that “Section 1025 places limits on the military’s
authority to transfer third country nationals currently held at the
detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan ... and could interfere
with my ability as Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive
determinations about the appropriate disposition of detainees in
an active area of hostilities.”41 The president’s views of the
Commander in Chief powers were just that – views. The president
did not necessarily contemplate any change in the status of
detainees in the Parwan facility. President Obama renewed a
similar concern the following year in a signing statement
responding to the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Act’s restriction on transferring third country
nationals held at Guantanamo Bay: “the restrictions on the
transfer of Guantanamo detainees in sections 1034 and 1035
operate in a manner that violates constitutional separation of
powers principles.” More specifically, Obama stated that “[t]he
executive branch must have the flexibility to act swiftly in
conducting negotiations with foreign countries regarding the
circumstances of detainee transfers.”42
Unlike the Attorney General Opinions, the signing
statements do not of their own terms reference prior signing
statements. No explicit form of precedent exists. Nonetheless, the
constitutional interpretation reflected in the statements often
follows that previously articulated and creates a form of
precedent. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama all signed laws
expressing constitutional skepticism over Congress’s ability to
direct executive branch officials to communicate with Congress
38. Statement on Signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 2132 (Nov. 25, 2002).
39. Pub. L. No. 10-33, 111 Stat. 251, 414 (1997).
40. Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1053,
1054 (Aug. 5, 1997).
41. Supra note 35.
42. Id.
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directly without the involvement of supervisors in the executive
branch. Like the Attorney General Opinions, the signing
statements resemble Advisory Opinions to a limited extent,
expounding on how to interpret the Constitution in circumstances
that may never arise. Although the Attorney General Opinions
more consciously create precedent, both are sources from which
can be discerned executive interpretation of the Constitution.
3. BACKING UP INTERPRETATION WITH CONDUCT
President Obama’s constitutional views as reflected in the
2013 and 2014 signing statements took on a new dimension when
he subsequently transferred detainees from Guantanamo to
Qatar without first notifying Congress as required in the 2014
Authorization Act. He ordered the transfer to complete an
agreement for the release of Bowe Bergdahl, the sole remaining
U.S. military prisoner of war in Afghanistan.43 In other words, he
acted on what he had threatened in the signing statement –
ignoring Congress’s insistence on being notified before any such
transfer. President Obama, moreover, publicly defended his
decision to circumvent Congress in arranging for the detainee
swap.44 Words merged with deeds, deepening the precedential
force of his previously stated constitutional concerns for ensuring
executive branch flexibility in transferring foreign detainees.
Precedents are most powerful when presidents justify
conduct
contemporaneously
through
constitutional
interpretation. Indeed, Attorneys General themselves have noted
the greater strength of executive interpretive precedents when the
interpretations have been followed in practice.45 The justification
serves as a limited check to ensure that the president (or staff) has
considered the impact of the interpretation on future conduct.
Much like Congress considering the prospective impact of
legislation or a court considering how a rule might be applied in
the future, such presidential reasoning assures that action has
been preceded by at least some discussion and assessment of what
presidents might do in the future.
43. See Tumulty, supra note 34.
44. Stephanie Condon, Obama: “I Make Absolutely No Apologies” for Bergdahl
Prisoner Exchange, CBS NEWS (June 5, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-imake-absolutely-no-apologies-for-bergdahl-prisoner-exchange/.
45. See Morrison, supra note 16 (noting that “the precedential weight of those
opinions was a function not just of the opinions themselves but also of the extent to which
relevant executive officials acted in conformity with them”).
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Presidential veto statements, for another example, unite
words and deeds. When President Jackson vetoed the National
Bank, he explained why he believed that the national government
lacked constitutional authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to centralize the financial system in that manner (p. 97).46
The union of action and deed permits the public to see at least one
concrete consequence of the constitutional interpretation. The
same held true for President Woodrow Wilson in vetoing the first
Budget and Accounting Bill based on Congress’s decision to
retain for itself a role in removing the Comptroller General and
Assistant Comptroller General: “It has, I think, always been the
accepted construction of the Constitution that the power to
appoint officers of this kind carries with it, as an incident, the
power to remove. I am convinced that Congress is without
constitutional power to limit the appointing power and its
incident, the power of removal derived from the Constitution.
The section referred to not only forbids the Executive to remove
these officers, but undertakes to empower the Congress, by a
concurrent resolution to remove an officer.”47 And, when
President Obama instructed the Department of Justice to
abandon reliance on the Defense of Marriage Act in litigation
over federal benefits to married gays and lesbians, he did so on
the ground that the Act violated the constitutional principle of
equality (p. 455).48
Presidential accountability within our system of separated
powers, after all, leans heavily upon transparency. Constitutional
interpretation needs to be vetted publicly for a meaningful check
to arise. The check is imperfect, but presenting constitutional
justification to the public forces at least consideration of future
circumstances and the judgment of history. Indeed, the heated
controversy during the Bush II administration over release of the
DOJ’s so-termed torture memo—defending the propriety of at
least some forms of torture—suggests the critical step of public
46. Veto Message from Andrew Jackson to the Senate (July 10, 1832), in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 576, 58182 (1907).
47. SMALL, supra note 8, at 137. Wilson’s statements would gain judicial sanction in
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating Congress’s role in removing a
Comptroller General from office). President Jefferson’s pardon of those convicted under
the Alien and Sedition Acts, supra text accompanying note 5, is to similar effect—the
president, in essence, gave legal effect to his constitutional views.
48. See also Johnsen, supra note 5, at 599.
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scrutiny. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez withdrew the
memo after the outcry (p. 421). Of course, the publicity need not
persuade the president to desist. When an angry Senate
demanded papers from President Cleveland as to why he fired a
particular United States Attorney, Cleveland refused on the
ground that it was none of the Senators’ business under the
Constitution and directed the Senate to focus rather on whether
to confirm the individual nominated as a replacement.
Unpersuaded, Congress issued a resolution of censure
condemning the administration’s refusal to supply the papers. In
response, Cleveland wrote, “[T]he important question then, is
whether it is within the constitutional competence of either House
of Congress to have access to the official papers and documents
in the various public offices of the United States.” He answered
that Congress had no right “to sit in judgment upon the exercise
of my exclusive discretion and executive function” in replacing
the U.S. Attorney.49 By making his constitutional positions on the
removal authority and presidential privilege public, President
Cleveland contributed to the stature of the presidency.50
Contemporaneous justification of action through constitutional
interpretation creates the most compelling form of presidential
precedent.
CONCLUSION
In short, although Bruff persuasively argues that precedent
matters, not all precedent is of the same weight. Presidential
actions and statements both alter the terrain, but presidential
actions that are justified publicly have the most force. Such
contemporaneous justification removes the ambiguity caused by
unexplained presidential actions and increases the salience of
presidential expression of constitutional views that are not offered
in the context of a concrete presidential action. And, while
presidents do not and should not afford formal deference to prior
actions, the word and deeds of their predecessors greatly
influence the choices they make.

49. See Harold J. Krent, What Would Grover Cleveland Do? Alberto Gonzales
Should Have Learned A Thing Or Two from President Cleveland, NAT’L L. J., April 16,
2007.
50. The fact that President George W. Bush did not issue any contemporary
constitutional justification for NSA surveillance, in contrast, eroded public support.

